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Abstract. This paper analyses the cultural and biosemiotic bases of human attitudes 
towards other species. A critical stance is taken towards species neutrality and it is 
shown that human attitudes towards different animal species differ depending on 
the psychological dispositions of the people, biosemiotic conditions (e.g. umwelt 
stuctures), cultural connotations and symbolic meanings. In real-life environments, 
such as zoological gardens, both biosemiotic and cultural aspects influence which 
animals are chosen for display, as well as the various ways in which they are displayed 
and interpreted. These semiotic dispositions are further used as motifs in staging, 
personifying or de-personifying animals in order to modify visitors’ perceptions 
and attitudes. As a case study, the contrasting interpretations of culling a giraffe at 
the Copenhagen zoo are discussed. The communicative encounters and shifting 
per ceptions are mapped on the scales of welfaristic, conservational, dominionistic, 
and utilitarian approaches. The methodological approach described in this article 
integrates static and dynamical views by proposing to analyse the semiotic potential of 
animals and the dynamics of communicative interactions in combination.
Keywords: zoosemiotics; zoological gardens; animal evaluation; charismatic species; 
personification
Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to map the semiotic aspects of human evaluation of 
non human animals. The question of human attitudes towards nonhuman animals 
is predominantly tackled by in environmental psychology, animal welfare studies 
etc., but it also falls in the realm of semiotic study, as it is connected with cultural 
codes and practices, symbols and connotative meanings. In this paper, we focus on 
the relationship of different cultural layers of human attitudes towards other animal 
species and juxtapose these with the specific characteristics of nonhuman animals 
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themselves. Inasmuch as human attitudes towards nonhuman animals depend on 
the properties and communication capacities of animal species, they also constitute a 
topic of biosemiotic and zoosemiotic concern. As a practical application, we analyse 
the complexities of human attitudes towards animal species in zoological gardens and 
review the different strategies that are used there to modify human-animal relations. 
After that we elaborate the existing zoosemiotic typologies of anthropocentric 
attitudes and evaluation of animals and present a compound model to analyse 
different and conflicting positions of animals in zoological gardens. 
Although studies have demonstrated profound differences in how various human 
groups evaluate different nonhuman animal species, this issue has remained over-
looked in many practical areas that deal with nonhuman animals in the frame work of 
legal regulation and moral judgments. It can be argued that when the huma nities and 
social sciences attend to other animals, their research is influenced by different cultural 
perceptions and moralistic attitudes. It is also widely accepted that when laity or 
“common people” deal with animal-related topics, their attitudes are mostly humanistic 
(Koontz 1995: 131). A similar stance is not often recognized in natural sciences that 
can be argued to hold scientific, ecological or other ethically unburdened attitudes 
toward animals. When dealing with practical issues concerning animal management, 
biodiversity, species conservation, etc., it is evident that deci sions stemming from 
cultural perceptions pertaining to the species in question are restrained or rationalized 
with scientific explanations, thus minimizing or eliminating the distinctions that arise 
from an emotional affinity with certain species. This neutrality is a proclaimed position 
of many institutions working with animals, but the fabric of species egalitarianism often 
hides different factors of preference.1 In a milder version, the differences in attitudes 
are assumed to be rational, based on objective properties and differences in the species 
themselves. Let us consider two hypothetical examples: first, the list of species that, in 
legal documents, are considered to be invasive in a given fauna and are considered to 
be subjects of removal from the local ecosystem. Second, let us consider a situation 
in which zoological gardens make a decision for which nonhuman animals need to 
be removed as surplus individuals from a given ex situ population. In both cases, the 
moral assumption seems to be that such decisions have a rational basis and that they 
are based on an awareness of biological knowledge, while apart from that, the species 
and individuals are treated in an equal way. In other words, it is assumed that in many 
areas of human-animal relations, there should be no place for preferences deriving 
from cultural background, human evolutionary experience or personal histories.
1 Th is understanding takes into account (but is not directly based on) our earlier research on 
visitor studies in Tallinn Zoological Gardens conducted by Mäekivi in 2010 and 2012 and on 
the discourse of the golden jackal (Canis aureus) as an alien species in Estonia (Maran 2015). 
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The main argument of this paper is that there are deep culturally and biologically 
driven causes for humans’ varying attitudes towards specific species. In actual species 
conservation and animal welfare cases these attitudes may form a complex pattern 
of interactions between different interest groups, and therefore also need special 
attention in the semiotic study of human-animal relations. As an example of this 
necessity, in the final part of the paper we present an analysis of the contrasting 
interpretations of culling a giraffe at the Copenhagen zoo.
The dynamics of human attitudes towards other animals is predominantly 
addressed in environmental psychology. The majority of studies have related the 
approach to nonhuman animals to underlying human psychological dispositions, 
often in relation with general environmental values of humans. In a well-known 
typology, Stephen Kellert distinguished general values that humans associate with 
wildlife: naturalistic/outdoor recreational value, ecological value, moral or existence 
value, scientific value, aesthetic value, utilitarian value, and cultural/symbolic/
historical value (Kellert 1988: 52–53). In regard to nonhuman animals, Adelma M. 
Hills (1993: 111) has proposed three “motivational bases, where responses to animals 
depend on instrumental self-interest, empathy identification, or people’s beliefs and 
values about the nature and status of animals”. In general, several dominants can be 
distinguished in the studies on human attitudes towards nonhuman animals: (1) 
differences in regard to different animal species; (2) typologies of human attitudes; 
(3) different aspects or layers in valuation; (4) differences in valuation in regard to 
different social groups, genders, cultures, and others. Although not yet thoroughly 
developed, the realization of the importance of human attitudes towards other species 
is also starting to evolve in practical aspects of animal management – as William 
Conway (2003: 11) puts it: “Fundamentally, the saving of wildlife is a social process 
[...]. Ultimately, it depends less upon ‘how’ than upon ‘why’?. The existence and 
charisma of living animals are the best answers”.
Concerning the different attitudes in regard to different animal species, Stephen 
Kellert contributed pioneering studies in the late 1970s about public support towards 
nature conservation programmes (Kellert 1985, 1988). His inquiry that included 
eight local species showed that people’s readiness to support the protection of diffe-
rent species groups differs considerably across species [protection efforts of the bald 
eagle were supported by 89%, the eastern mountain lion by 73%, the Agassiz trout 
by 71%, the American crocodile by 70%, the silverspot butterfly by 64%, the eastern 
indigo snake by 43% and the Kauai wolf spider by 34% of responders (Kellert 1988: 
57)]. Later, similar results regarding differential attitudes toward various animal 
species have been gathered in various geographical areas and contexts: in ecotourism 
(Woods 2000), urban environment (Bjerke, Østdahl 2004), zoological gardens 
(Myers, Saunders 2004), and educational institutions (Schlegel, Rupf 2010). For 
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attitudes towards nonhuman animals, the similarity of the animal species to humans 
seems to be a decisive factor (Batt 2009), albeit not the only factor. The relationships 
between different aspects in human valuation of nonhuman animals have been 
brought together, for instance, by J. A. Serpell (2004) under the concept of ‘attitude 
modifiers’, which differentiates individual human attributes, animal attributes 
and cultural factors (including the effects of science).2 Semiotic aspects of human 
valuation of nonhuman animals have been addressed by several authors paying 
predominant attention to the underlying semiotic mechanisms: semiosis, umwelt, 
intentionality (Kull 2001; Martinelli 2008; Beever 2012; Pahin, Macfadyen 2013). 
Dario Martinelli (2007: 177–178, 2008) presents a two-dimensional and relatively 
static model for classifying anthropocentric attitudes that distinguishes between 
scientific/pragmatic, spiritual/emotional, and zoophilic and zoophobic attitudes.
The question of human attitudes to nonhuman animals appears to be multi-
dimensional and relatively dynamic. In the following sections, we focus on the 
semiotic aspects, that is, on cultural reasons for evaluating nonhuman animals and 
on characteristics specific to different animal species, from many possible angles. In 
doing this, our goal is to demonstrate that existing psychological and sociological 
understandings of animal valuation would benefit from considering cultural semiotic 
and biosemiotic aspects to a greater extent. 
How culture models nonhuman animals 
Different definitions of ‘animal’ tend to be twofold: firstly, they stress the scientific 
denotative aspect of the animal as a multicellular being belonging to the animal 
king dom; and secondly, they draw our attention to connotative meanings in making 
semantic distinctions. Especially prevalent are cases where the word ‘animal’ refers 
to a whole from which humans are excluded. As part of a connotative dimension, 
cultural-mythological meanings of different animal species have deep ramifications 
in history, art and religion with many forms and faces in contemporary culture. 
Characteristics attributed to animal species, such as lions and eagles referring to 
royalty, collective Hymenoptera referring to diligence and discipline, swans and 
doves referring to virtue and faithfulness, wolves, jackals and other Canidae referring 
to rudeness and traitorousness, owls referring to wisdom and mystery and so on 
constitute a rich and complex fabric of cultural imagination. Cultural-mythological 
motifs may form themes that are centred around some features or properties and 
2 In addition, human attitudes toward animal species can be infl uenced by occasional factors, 
such as environmental or temporal context or personal history and experience with the specifi c 
animal species. 
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that, in this way, surpass the limits of the taxonomical system. The connecting 
logic is often analogical and imitative (corresponding to J. G. Frazer’s principle of 
sympathetic magic). For example, in the context of Estonian culture, dark plumage 
is a connecting feature for birds of omen that are taxonomically far from one 
another: the raven Corvus corax, the black stork Ciconia nigra, the black woodpecker 
Dryocopus martius (Mäger 1994). 
In contemporary Western culture, mythological motifs are weakening, although 
they probably form an important layer of connotative meanings in animal appre ciation 
(for a discussion on ‘cultural keystone species’, see Garibaldi, Turner 2004). Today the 
mythological meaning layer appears to be outweighed by a scientific under standing 
and valuation, although in public discourse they can also become combined.3 ‘Scientific 
value’ has been distinguished as one of the general values or benefits that people 
use to associate nature and nonhuman animals with (Kellert 1988: 53). At the same 
time, science is an institution and discourse with a specific history and practices that 
influence the ways in which specific species and groups have been appreciated. What is 
particularly noticeable here is the legacy of 18th- and 19th-century natural history and 
the effect of species collections on attitudes toward nonhuman animals. Taxonomical 
groups that have been historically treated as “collectibles” – higher plants, birds, small 
fish, butterflies, Coleoptera – appear to have a more positive reputation compared to 
the species that have not been objects of natural history collections.4 Birds form an 
especially interesting case: historically objects of taxidermy and oological collections, 
birds continue to be favourite objects of attention for today’s amateur naturalists 
(cf. Moss 2004). The connecting feature of different practices is the valuation of the 
number of species collected or recorded with a special emphasis on rarity. Such cultural 
practices may be assumed to create a general positive background for attitudes towards 
finding a rare or alien species in a given area. For this reason, new bird species are often 
welcomed in public media with an interested and curious attitude, whereas attitudes 
towards carnivorous mammals are much more cautious and negative.
Both the cultural-mythological meanings and scientific understandings may con-
solidate to form well-defined semiotic structures known as symbols. In cultural-mytho-
logical modelling, this may take the form of totemic animals, animals used in heraldry, 
national animals, and others. Scientific understandings tend to symbolize animals that 
3 E.g. the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issued a permit allowing a Native American tribe 
in Wyoming to kill two bald eagles for religious purposes, despite the fact that bald eagles are 
protected under the federal Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (Fox News 2012. Wyoming 
Native American tribe gets rare permit to kill bald eagles. Fox News Politics 14.03.2012. 
Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/03/14/wyoming-native-american-tribe-
gets-rare-permit-to-kill-bald-eagles/; retrieved on 22.02.15). 
4 Among collected groups, there also exists a hierarchy of value based on animal rarity, body 
size, origin, etc.
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are used and valued as model objects of scientific research in molecular biology, ecology 
and cognitive studies: Drosophila melanogaster, the nematode Caenor habditis elegans, 
the zebra finch Taeniopygia guttata, rhesus monkey Macaca mulatta, and others. In 
conservation biology and nature protection movements, a special status is often given 
to the characteristic and charismatic species from a given area as a ‘flagship species’: the 
great panda, the Bengal tiger, the kiwi, the European bison, and others. We consider, 
however, these apparent cases of animal symbolization in cultural-mythological and 
scientific consciousness to be just peaks in the much more general semiotic landscape that 
influences interpretations of each and every animal species.
Nonhuman animals as communication partners: 
appearance and umwelt
Biosemiotics and zoosemiotics have long argued for the role of animal subjectivity in 
ecological and evolutionary processes (Hoffmeyer 2008; Markoš et al. 2009; Maran et 
al. 2011). Following this tradition, we claim that in addition to cultural-mythological 
and scientific meaning complexes, also the activity of nonhuman animals themselves, 
their appearance, umwelt and specific properties have an effect on how humans 
evaluate other animals. At this point, let us distinguish between two principal aspects 
of appearance and umwelt structure. ‘Appearance’ (also ‘phenomenal structures’; 
Portmann 1964: 74) was a concept used by German biological philosopher Adolf 
Portmann (1990: 25–29) to describe the forms and visual patterns of animals that 
they use to present themselves to the environment. As a means for presentation, 
animal appearances set out possibilities to establish relationships. These appearances 
are, however, not fixed to function in existing inter- and intraspecific communicative 
relations but have also semiotic potential to start new interpretations and new relations: 
“The surface’s display is a part of the presentation of self of a living being. To be sure, 
the perceiving eye plays no role in the life-realm in which patterns and designs first 
arise [...] but, in that same life-realm the possibility of perceived beings already exists – 
and that potential leads to the further promise of an enrichment of living relationships” 
(Portmann 1990: 25). This property of animal appearances makes emerging new 
communicative relations possible, including those with humans in the context of 
natural history collections, pet stores, zoological gardens, etc. Portmann’s concept of 
appearance predominantly refers to animals’ exterior surfaces and visual perception, 
but it can also be used to describe other sensory modalities as well as dynamics of forms 
and movement. There are evolutionary and ecological causes in many species groups – 
for instance tropical songbirds, butterflies, lizards, and coral reef and freshwater fish – 
to have a vivid appearance. Vivid appearances as well as using them dynamically in 
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behavioural displays also provide a good basis for humans to attribute meanings to 
nonhuman animals and to become emotionally attached to them. 
The extent to which humans perceive and interpret other animals’ appearances 
depends on the relationship of their subjective worlds or umwelts (Uexküll 1982). 
Communication channels and modalities of different animal species differ: in some 
cases there is a significant overlap between the umwelts of humans and a nonhuman 
animal species, while in other cases the richness of animal forms and signals is barely 
accessible to humans (e.g. forms, behavioural and chemical signals of insects). Also, 
nonhuman animals’ capacities and motivation to relate to humans and to address 
humans by communicative means differ depending on their cognitive capacities, 
the position of meaning of humans in animal umwelts and other properties. 
Heini Hediger (1969: 77) has distinguished between five classes of meanings that 
animals can attribute to humans: an enemy, prey, a symbiont, a piece of inanimate 
environment or a member of its own species. It appears that physical resemblance, 
similarity of the sense organs and inhabiting the same environment create the 
preconditions, but it is rather the correspondence between umwelt structures that 
directs humans to appreciate some nonhuman animals more than others.
To emphasize the appeal of certain animal groups to humans, specific notions 
have been proposed such as ‘vertebrate chauvinism’ (Randall 1986: 88) or 
‘charismatic megafauna’ (Rolston 1990). There are, however, more specific properties 
that can be considered when making predictions about possible human attitudes 
towards the given animal species. Classical ethologist Konrad Lorenz proposed 
the concept of Kindchenschema (cuteness) to denote the specific child-like facial 
proportions of a flat face with large eyes, small nostrum or nose, etc. that characterize 
juvenile individuals in many vertebrate groups and also tend to evoke parental caring 
behaviour (Lorenz 1943). Kindchenschema properties are both individual, but also 
characteristic of specific species. In zoological gardens and other environments of 
human-animal encounters, the complex interplay between individuality and species-
specificity takes place. For Kindchenschema to be enacted and communicative 
interactions and emotional attachment to develop, concrete individuals are 
needed. Those animals, however, have a double representational character. They 
simultaneously represent themselves as individual living beings in their own right 
and stand for their species as a general type. In the next section, the dynamics and 
problems of this double representation are described in detail. 
In a broader sense, the issue of Kindchenschema or cuteness also evokes the 
question of possible interactions between humans and nonhuman animals as 
regards both behavioural (care giving, parental relation) and ecological (symbiosis, 
predation) relations. This relates to Konrad Lorenz’ idea of companion species that 
was inspired by Jakob v. Uexküll’s notion of Kumpan (Lorenz 1937: 260) – that is, a 
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species with properties that respond and fulfill the animal’s (or human’s) behavioural 
function that is active at the given moment. Relations that make us become attached 
to some species more than others are thus at least partly pre-cultural and belong to 
the biosemiotic realm. In zoological gardens, the popularity of different species of 
zoo animals is measured by visitor interest expressed by the attracting power of the 
animal(s) (the number of times visitors stop) and holding time of the animal(s) (for 
how long the visitors stop). The most critical indicator of visitor interests tends to be 
taxonomic groups, with mammals – belonging to the same class as humans – being 
the most captivating (Moss, Esson 2010).
As most of the properties mentioned above are permanent for the given species 
and objectively describable, we propose that it is possible to map the potential of 
different species to become objects of positive or negative valuation by humans. In 
such an analysis, the following criteria could be used:
• Is the given species a vertebrate?
• Is its body size comparable to or larger than the human one?
• Does the given species have a collective lifestyle?
• Does the given species have colourful patterns, does it emit loud and diverse 
sounds, or does it have other rich intraspecific communication strategies 
accessible to humans?
• Does the umwelt (i.e. the communication channels used, meaning relations to en-
viron mental resources) of the given species have considerable overlap with the 
human umwelt?
• Does the given species have ecological relations (prey-predator relations, sym-
biosis, parasitism) with humans or is there potential for behavioural (care giving, 
parental relation) relations?
• Does the Lorenzian concept of Kindchenschema apply for the given species?
If most of these questions receive a positive answer, then the relationship of the given 
animal species to humans may be seen to enhance human attitudes towards the animal. 
The question of whether humans value the animal positively or negatively is not ad-
dressed here, as this needs more detailed analysis, and also, different interest groups 
may value the same species differently within the same complex relation. We will return 
briefly to given points in our case study. What can be deduced generally is just an 
overall inclination towards valuation. Our argument also questions the imperative of 
species egalitarianism common in human-animal studies and animal rights philosophy. 
Even if species egalitarianism is desirable as a principle, our actual relations to other 
species are often rooted in our cultural and biological history. Difference in valuation 
comes by default. This means that in areas of human-animal relations where equality of 
or a neutral attitude towards different species is an important principle, the inclinations 
and preconceptions involved in valuation need continuous attention and analysis. 
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The case of zoological gardens
Zoological gardens as institutions are particularly suitable examples of how culture 
and animal characteristics model the perception and lives of non-human animals: 
here, ample possibilities for inter-species communication arise, which in turn 
contribute to developing perceptions and attitudes towards different species and 
individuals inhabiting the zoo environment. This topic is important in order to draw 
attention to the fact that species-neutrality hardly exists, that human perception of 
non-human animals is value-laden. The suggestion is that it is problematic to make a 
clear-cut division between what an animal or a species is (in a biological, ecological, 
etc. sense) and what people or different interest groups perceive the animal or species 
to be. More often, especially in practical endeavours, it is very difficult to clearly 
distinguish between approaches to animals as biological beings and as culturally 
constructed beings due to the mutual interconnectedness of these approaches.
In addition to a species-biased approach that proves to be quite prevalent in zoo 
environments, the dynamic nature of perceiving and valuing other species should be 
analysed in order to comprehend the myriad of possibilities for attitudes and their 
manifestations in a variety of contexts. Perceptions and attitudes towards non-human 
animals, although strongly tied to our cultural and biological heritage, are not entirely 
carved in stone. There are possibilities to facilitate the changing of those perceptions 
and attitudes or, if need be, creating them in the first place. In modelling people’s 
perceptions or interpretations of other species, the dynamical dimension in altering and 
influencing attitudes and perceptions has often been left unnoticed or unaccounted for. 
However, in order to analyse specific case studies dealing with practical aspects in animal 
management, which, as we claim, often have hidden roots in the basis of how people 
evaluate animals and species, it is highly relevant to also draw attention to the underlying 
principles that enable people and different interest groups to shift between different 
representations and perceptions of a given species or an animal. Consequently, it becomes 
obvious that human-nonhuman communication  – our perceptions, representations, 
attitudes, etc. of them – and possible alterations of the latter, are closely intertwined. 
It is to be argued that with the advent of species conservation, animal rights 
move ments, legislations in animal welfare, etc., the perceptions of zoo animals in 
general and all the species under scrutiny have never been and are still not uni-
form. Although the changed functions of zoological gardens5 indicate that the 
5 Th e zoological gardens have shift ed their focus from leisure time entertainment to more serious 
and profound goals of nature education, scientifi c work and species conservation. Th e contemporary 
zoological gardens of the 21st century consider themselves to be ex situ preservation centres, where 
Earth’s fauna is exhibited in an educational manner (Association of Zoos and Aqariums 2015. 
Guide to Accreditation of Zoological Parks and Aquariums, 10. Available at: http://www.aza.org/
uploadedFiles/Accreditation/Guide%20to%20Accreditation.pdf; retrieved on 05.01.2015)).
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zoo institution’s understanding of animals in its care has changed, there is a vast 
diversity in attitudes that visitors and other interest groups hold towards animals in 
general and towards different species exhibited in zoos. The practical applications 
of ex situ animal manage ment in zoos (e.g. enclosure enrichment, culling, creating 
suitable social groupings, sterilizing, etc.) are supported by scientific knowledge of 
zoo husbandry. Nevertheless, despite the progress of scientific knowledge, animal 
management practices in zoological gardens can still develop into a major source 
for inter-group controversies and also, to a certain extent, hinder the survival of 
some species. Thus the reasons that give rise to differences in opinion pertaining 
to animal management practices should be reckoned with. We believe that one of 
the main reasons for these controversies are the underlying various attitudes to and 
perceptions of animals that people and interest groups have. A semiotic basis for 
evaluating non-human animals in the context of zoological gardens can shed light on 
this complex and difficult issue.
Zoosemiotic studies, especially as developed by Dario Martinelli (cf. Martinelli 
2007, 2010), permits us to reveal the interconnectedness and strong co-dependence 
of biological and cultural factors when dealing with human-animal communication, 
including that occurring in the zoological garden. Non-human animal communication 
and human non-verbal communication have been described as part of traditional 
ethological zoosemiotics, while human representations and perceptions of other 
species form the anthropological branch of zoosemiotics (Martinelli 2010). However, 
the key factor here is acknowledging that both of the subdivisions are brought together 
under the common denominator of zoosemiotics, which indicates that they share some 
generic ground and a starting point in researching communication and representation 
of other animals. Thus, it is accepted in zoo/biosemiotics, that our cultural tendencies 
in dealing with other species are strongly rooted in our biological makeup and in our 
ability to communicate with other species to a lesser or greater extent. As already 
explained in the introduction of this article, umwelt compatibility of different species 
plays a crucial role in inter-species communication between humans and non-humans. 
Since umwelts of different species are not entirely compatible, there is plenty of room 
for interpretive freedom (including misinterpreting6) the communicative signals of an 
6 Most typical cases that provide evidence for the aforementioned overlap in human and 
large mammals’ umwelts are instances where zoo visitors or other interest groups attribute to 
mammals the emotions of sadness, boredom, etc., so oft en exhibited and recognized by people 
themselves. Th is is not to claim that other species do not have or do not exhibit emotions, the 
claim is rather that there is a wide variety of bodily and facial expressions that people are able to 
recognize in other mammals, but that can still be misinterpreted, e.g. the upturned mouth of a 
bottle-nose dolphin has made them popular for their friendly smile, although they are actually 
not smiling; the big cats tend to sleep most of the day, so people oft en interpret their behaviour 
as expressing boredom, etc.
 Semiotic dimensions of human attitudes towards other animals  219
animal from another species. In reality it is very difficult, if not impossible, to clearly 
distinguish between biological and cultural meanings when analysing concrete cases 
of animal management, since they are closely intertwined. Thus it remains debatable 
whether the emphasis on over-representing mammals in human-animal relation 
studies and in zoological gardens should be put down to our own biological or cultural 
nature. We believe that accounting for both factors can make it easier to approach 
problems that arise in human-nonhuman encounters in zoos.
 
Staging of animals and changing attitudes
Large charismatic mammals have always been the most popular animals throughout 
the history of zoological gardens – animals to whom we can best relate and animals 
that resemble us most, as well as the animals with whom we can best communicate. 
Animals with the highest ‘exhibition value’7 have forward pointing eyes, because 
people generally interpret them as more responsive than non-aggressive herbivorous 
species with laterally placed eyes; however, forward pointing eyes are meant to 
give accurate depth perception for better pouncing on the prey (Lacy 1995: 191). 
Although this might indicate a distinction between carnivorous and herbivorous 
mammals, it does not seem to be severe when we look at the attention given to 
large mammals in comparison with fish, reptiles, amphibians or even birds.8 The 
claim for popularity of mammals sides with considerable umwelt compatibility 
between other large mammals and humans, even if sometimes there are instances 
of misinterpretation in our communication. Advocating for mammals is further 
supported by the zoo insti tution’s strategy in appealing to people: the majority of zoo 
logos and their websites feature pandas, orangutans, lions, giraffes, elephants and 
other species that catch people’s attention and elicit a strong emotional response from 
the public (Cushing, Markwell 2011). Especially prevalent are pictures of newborn 
mammals, which speak in favour of the Lorenzian concept of Kindchenschema, and 
displaying these is a general tactic in raising visitor numbers during calving periods.9
7 A typical zoo concept meant to describe the likeability or attractiveness of an animal (e.g. 
Mullan, Marvin 1987: 74).
8 For example, most 20th-century conservation programmes were centred on large mammals 
(Adams 2004).
9 Th e Association of Zoos and Aquaria even has a webpage ‘Zooborns’ for exhibiting 
newborn animals, with a catchy slogan, “from cute to conservation” (Zooborn homepage. 
Avaible at: http://www.zooborns.com/; retrieved on 04.02.2015).
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Different species in zoos are, to a certain degree, managed in a way compatible 
with the visitors’ perceptions of those species, due to the fact that the visitors’ 
financial support is immensely important in order for the zoo’s conservation 
endeavour to succeed (Hosey et al. 2009). This support can often be gained only 
together with moral support, indicating that people approve of the animal managing 
practices of the zoo. The greatest controversies regarding keeping wild animals 
in captivity and the ways they are kept are often arise in relation to charismatic 
mammals. The reason for this can lie in the fact that mammals have more 
complicated umwelts compared to, for example, invertebrate species. Thus, it is more 
difficult to create biologically suitable living conditions for them in the zoological 
garden, so these species are at the centre of attention and need to be dealt with in 
more depth. This claim holds ground to a certain point, but the other reason for 
mammals being at the centre of attention is their similarity to us. In other words, 
this means that the visitor’s biological and cultural preferences for animals become 
a factor that zoos start taking into account when shaping their species collections 
and husbandry practices. Although welfare is a major concern in managing ex 
situ wildlife, paradoxically guaranteeing the animals’ good welfare, including their 
species-specific behavioural characteristics, it is sometimes not in accordance with 
people’s attitudes towards animals and their behaviour. The most evident cases 
are the predator-prey relationships, which are in many circumstances denied to 
large carnivorous mammals inhabiting zoological gardens (Mullan, Marvin 1987). 
Interestingly, when the prey is a small mammal (e.g. a mouse instead of a goat), fish 
or some species or invertebrate there is considerably less, if any, objection from the 
public. This peculiar finding may again be supported by our perception of similarity 
between the prey animal and ourselves, and a more neutral or indifferent attitude 
towards animals that we seem to have less in common with. It might be easier to feel 
empathetic towards a large mammal than a small mammal – especially if the small 
mammal is culturally perceived as a pest – while our umwelt is even less shared with 
that of a fish or a worm, a snail, etc. 
There is a variety of different strategies employed to generalize the attitudes that 
people may hold towards zoo animals. These attitudes include, but are not limited 
to, welfaristic, conservational, utilitarian, mechanistic, phobic and dominionistic 
attitudes. In addition, there are also intermediate attitudes of the aforementioned, 
and furthermore, people may hold different attitudes toward different species and 
animals, and a certain species or animal may receive different attitudes from different 
people. These attitudes are depicted in Fig. 1, which is an adaptation of Martinelli’s 
(2010: 311) model of anthropocentric attitudes towards animals.
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Figure 1. Dimensions of human attitudes towards animals. 
The original model has been modified to describe the possible attitudes that different 
interest groups may hold towards animals in zoological gardens. In addition, it is 
used to portray the dynamics of shifting attitudes on the axis of empathetic/non-
empathetic and scientific/pragmatic-emotional. Empathetic and non-empathetic 
can be considered as a general attitude of favouring or disregarding animals.10 The 
scientific/pragmatic and emotional axis represents whether the attitudes that people 
hold stem from emotions or if there is some accepted knowledge-based awareness. 
We shall discuss, in the light of proposed examples, the attitudes that fall on the 
general axes, i.e. the conservational, the mechanistic/utilitarian, the welfaristic, 
the dominionistic. We shall also discuss the relations between these attitudes and 
perceptions, where evident; these are marked with discontinuous black arrows. The 
movements that were not evident, but are theoretically possible, are drawn with 
discontinuous grey arrows. It must be stressed that although movement is possible 
on both axes (and most attitudes are not situated in extremes), the shift of attitudes 
between extremes – a diagonal movement on the model – cannot be done without 
intermediate steps, if at all.
Welfaristic perception can be observed in people who might have little know-
ledge of animal communication or the relations that animals have with their 
10 Th e actual outcome of empathetic and non-empathetic attitudes does not necessarily 
always help or hurt animals.
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environment and conspecifics. Consequently, they may have beliefs that are not 
supported by ethological or other relevant studies. From their point of view, zoo 
animals are basically perceived as victims of human power and are considered 
weak and helpless, so people believe they have a moral duty to show compassion in 
aiding and supporting them.11 They want to see active and socialized animals living 
in nature-like conditions. Since we have shown that humans are species-biased, it 
is obvious that the welfaristic attitude does not apply equally to all species, or, as a 
matter of fact, to all individuals of the same species. People create connections on an 
emotional empathetic basis and it is much easier to connect to a single personified 
animal than to a general and abstract ‘species’. Zoological gardens employ something 
that we call personification strategy, which means that individuals with whom the 
public can actually come into contact when visiting a zoo are given names, their 
life stories are displayed and their personal likes and dislikes are discussed during 
keeper talks, so that the welfaristic attitude could be channelled to an individual and 
intensified through the given narrative. In essence, pet-like perceptions of animals 
are encouraged; people are invited to create stronger positive attitudes towards these 
animals, similar to those with the pets they might have at home. However, in order 
to personify an animal, the animal has to be distinguishable from its conspecifics, 
which indicates that animals who are present in large numbers in zoological gardens 
are usually not separately identifiable for the public. So even though animal class 
plays a role in personification (mammals being once again favoured over others), 
the size and the rarity of the animal is also crucial. For example, marmosets usually 
have a dozen or more animals in one enclosure at a zoo, and although they have a 
quite high ‘exhibition value’ and are active, social and relatively compatible with the 
Kindchenschema notion, it is difficult for people to distinguish individual animals 
exhibited in such large numbers. Thus, it is uncommon for them to have public life 
stories and names. On the other hand, animals such as the American crocodile, 
who are neither ‘warm and furry’ nor particularly active and social compared to 
marmosets, but are large and exotic and often kept in small numbers, appear to be 
good candidates for personification. In the case of crocodiles, personification can 
also serve the purpose of decreasing phobic attitudes – herpetophobia being very 
common – or indifferent attitudes towards the animals.
To develop visitors’ awareness of animals, zoological gardens appear to use a two-
stage strategy. Animal personification is used to raise a sentiment in people to make 
them care about the animal, so that public endorsement for species conservation 
could be achieved. In order to shift the attention based on emotions to the zoo’s 
functions or goals, however, the zoo in turn needs to de-personify animals. They 
11 Th ey might not even know that welfare as a scientifi c stance, although advocating for the 
physical and mental well-being of an individual, does not oppose humane killing of an animal. 
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need to show that although this particular animal will not suffer from hunger, habitat 
loss, or poachers, his or her conspecifics do, and they need people’s support. The 
most common means to de-personify an animal, raising welfaristic attitudes towards 
the whole species, uses the same media as personification of the animal – through 
signage and keeper talks. At a zoo exhibit that a personified animal inhabits, there is 
a sign of the animal’s life story, and next to it is a general description of the species 
and sometimes some comparison with species belonging to the same genus. Keeper 
talks and shows employ the same techniques – although they introduce the concrete 
animals and their personality traits, they mostly tend to move to more general topics 
of species behaviour or morphology and, of course, to conservational issues.
Such semiotic strategies combine individual and species-specific potentials of 
animals and may propagate welfaristic and conservational attitudes simultaneously. A 
conservational attitude projects people’s perceptions of an animal to the whole species 
or population and welfaristic attitudes are directed toward concrete individuals. 
Although such a dyadic approach appears to be effective for the educational goals of 
the modern zoological gardens, there is also a downside that derives from the partial 
incompatibility of species conservation and animal welfare. Animals in conservation 
programmes are often treated as gene pools, meaning their mates for producing 
offspring are often selected on the basis of genetic diversity, while individual animals 
not contributing to this diversity are considered surplus and culled.12 This rational or 
scientific attitude towards animals can even be considered utilitarian on a pragmatic 
level, or dominionistic on an emotional level. Dominionistic perception is regarded 
as the opposite of welfaristic perception, and although they both emphasize human 
management of or control over animals, only in the case of dominionistic perception 
do people tend to feel non-empathetic towards the individual animals. It is possible 
for a person to have a welfaristic attitude towards an animal and also a conservational 
attitude towards the species that the animal belongs to, as long as there is no 
disruption between the two, especially if the life of the animal is under question. The 
culling of a personified animal with a name and a life-story is especially conflicting 
with the welfaristic perception of that animal. Thus, even though it is possible to 
change one’s attitudes from welfaristic to conservational, the latter stance is more 
abstract and consequently more fragile. However, if a person has a prevalently 
conservational attitude towards a species, the perception of a member of that species 
can be more neutral or indifferent. 
We apply a modified model of Martinelli’s anthropocentric attitudes (Martinelli 
2010: 311) to highlight the dynamics of conflicts in perceptions and attitudes that 
may arise in a concrete situation taking place in the zoo environment. This model 
serves to illustrate the possible movement between attitudes and perceptions and 
12 If no other suitable zoological gardens are willing to take them.
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the possible conflicts arising in regard to different attitudes of different interest 
groups. We shall use only the relevant typologies of perceptions exemplifying the 
controversies appearing in our chosen case. The example is based on a giraffe – a 
large charismatic mammal – the tallest of all mammals that has a specific skin pattern 
of patches and a long neck as its distinctive features, making the giraffe one of the 
most popular species during a zoo visit. Although Lorenzian Kindchenschema may 
not apply to giraffes in the concept’s traditional sense, the perceived awkwardness of 
the movements of giraffes (e.g. spreading their front legs to reach the ground) and the 
variety of their facial expressions (due to flexible mouth and long tongue), giraffes 
evoke strong emotional response and thus may be argued to possess the “cuteness 
factor”. Once again, there are also cultural perceptions contributing to giraffes’ 
popularity: “In the 21st century, it has been named the national animal of Tanzania, 
and in Botswana it is considered to be ‘royal’ and may not be hunted. Its distinctive, 
iconic image is used across the world to advertise anything from mobile phones to 
insurance, motor bikes and whisky.”13 Giraffes in situ can live and move in large herds 
or be solitary (mainly older males), in zoos they are grouped with regard to also 
economic and spatial restraints, which at times may prove to be difficult for their 
social relations (e.g. conflict-prone behaviour). 
The case we are observing concerns Copenhagen zoo’s giraffe who was shot, 
dissected in public and fed to the lions in early 2014. Although the giraffe was 
a charismatic mammal, he was not personified and thus did not have a pet-like 
representation of him during his life at the zoo. However, the attractive appearance 
and general cultural heritage gave the giraffe a potential to become an individualized 
subject of the discourse. His keepers had named him Marius14 and disclosed this 
information (along with his life story) to the media when the intentions of culling a 
perfectly healthy giraffe reached the public. Thus, the personified perception of him 
in the eyes of the public was formed on the verge of the giraffe’s death and soon after 
it. People holding welfaristic attitudes strongly objected to the culling15 of Marius, 
especially since offers to take him were made by other zoos.16 Conservationists, on 
the other hand, stated that the giraffe’s welfare had already been damaged, because 
he was too old to be in the herd he had been born in and his father was already 
abusing him. Sterilizing the animal would have damaged his quality of life. It has to 
13 Giraff e Conservation Foundation 2013. Available at: http://www.giraff econservation.org/
booklets.php (Retrieved on 10.10.2015).
14 See http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2014/02/10/131701.htm.
15 Welfaristic attitude holders called it ʽbutchering’ and ʽdestroying’ – revealing the act to 
bear strong negative connotations. 
16 Th orton, Lucy 2014. Marius the giraff e butchered in front of children and fed to lions at 
Copenhagen Zoo. Mirror Online 10.02.2014. Available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/
world-news/marius-giraff e-butchered-front-children-3129390 (Retrieved on 03.02.2015).
 Semiotic dimensions of human attitudes towards other animals  225
be noted that Copenhagen zoo with its principle of not sterilizing animals creates a 
contrast with the majority of accredited zoos that do sterilize their animals,17 which 
indicates the importance of the cultural context in managing wildlife and has a direct 
influence on the animals’ lives. Sterilized animals do not breed; on the other hand 
they miss out on social relations like rearing offspring. However having offspring 
creates the problem of managing them, especially in a spatially limited city zoo like 
that of Copenhagen. Since Marius’ genes were well represented and there were no 
acceptable (accredited) zoos to give the animal to, Marius turned out to be simply 
surplus.18 It was also stated that the culling of the animal was conducted in a humane 
way out of sight of the public and he even had his last meal.19 In an act of providing 
the last supper and considering that the act of killing something should be done 
painlessly and not be shared by the public, conservationists had incorporated some of 
the welfaristic views into their own attitudes.
The welfaristic perception of Marius by the public was burdened by a lack 
of knowledge of demands for rehoming a zoo animal and the life quality of the 
animal. The welfarists could definitely not apprehend de-personifying Marius into a 
utilitarian view of “collection of genes useless to the breeding program”.20 Before the 
culling, welfarists even gathered more than 27,000 signatures on a petition to save the 
giraffe’s life.21 To worsen the controversy, mechanistic representations of the giraffe 
were also displayed – he was dissected like a research object in front of the public 
and later, parts of him were fed to lions.22 The welfarists answered with death threats 
to the zoo staff.23 According to media discourse study pertaining to this case, it also 
has to be brought to light that international mainstream media seems to constitute 
a higher relative amount of intensity and emotions than the Danish media scene 
(Zimmerman et al. 2014).
17 https://theconversation.com/death-of-marius-the-giraff e-reveals-cultural-diff erences-in-
animal-conservation-23052
18 Copenhagen Zoo website. Available at: http://zoo.dk/BesogZoo/Nyhedsarkiv/2014/Februar/ 
Why%20Copenhagen%20Zoo%20euthanized%20a%20giraff e.aspx (Retrieved on 04.02.2015).
19 See http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/140210-giraff e-copenhagen-science/.
20 Eriksen, Lars; Kennedy, Maev 2014. Marius the giraff e killed at Copenhagen zoo despite 
worldwide protests. Th e Guardian 09.02.2014. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/feb/09/marius-giraff e-killed-copenhagen-zoo-protests (Retrieved on 04.02.2015).
21 Evans, Maria 2014. Save Marius the giraff e from the bolt gun NOW. Petition Site. Available 
at: http://www.thepetitionsite.com/528/607/193/save-marius-the-giraff e-from-the-bolt-gun-
now/ (Retrieved on 04.02.2015).
22 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/09/marius-giraff e-killed-copenhagen-
zoo-protests.
23 Smith, Roff  2014. Giraff e killing at Copenhagen Zoo sparks global outrage. National 
Geographic 10.02.2014. Available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/ 
140210-giraff e-copenhagen-science/ (Retrieved on 04.02.2015).
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In the context of the present article, it needs to be noted that the disagreement 
was in several ways related to the biological and cultural causes of human attitudes 
towards other animals. Being a charismatic mammal, the giraffe had semiotic 
potential for becoming a subject of personified perceptions and welfaristic attitudes. 
At the same time, public attachment to the charismatic mammals is a reason why 
zoological gardens are tempted to keep the giraffes, lions, zebras, bears and other 
charismatic mammals to appeal to people and raise visitor numbers. At least indirect-
ly, the attractiveness of the large mammals to the public, in combination with 
different business and conservation aims of zoological gardens, creates the stage for 
the Marius controversy. The conflict of the welfaristic and utilitarian attitudes can 
be interpreted as a part of this larger social communicative system. We could not 
find any expressions of unconcerned/indifferent attitudes which is either due to the 
fact that most of the questions proposed for valuating a species received a positive 
answer or, redundantly, that people with indifferent attitudes remained unconcerned 
and thus do not speak out. 
The example of the giraffe Marius also shows that it is not possible to reconcile 
the most personified perception (pet-like, welfaristic) with the extreme case of de-
personification (utilitarian, mechanistic). However, in more moderate cases, there 
is the possibility, in essence, to shift one’s perceptions and attitudes between neutral-
welfaristic (empathetic personification24), welfaristic-conservational (empathetic de-
personification) and even conservational-utilitarian/mechanistic (non-empathetic 
extreme de-personification). In these ways the personification/de-personification 
strategies described above are often used. It is also clear that different interest groups 
(e.g. visitors, animal rights activists, conservational biologists) may hold different 
perceptions of different animals or species. Moreover, the possible shifts or conflicts 
between different perceptions could be dependent on the type and management of the 
specific zoo, the local cultural context, the specific animal species under observation 
and other characteristics. The different perspectives are more obscure than they 
are straightforwardly coherent, and are brought forward to show the spectrum of 
general possibilities of how animals can be perceived. Therefore we suggest using the 
dimensions of welfaristic, conservational, dominionistic and utilitarian as a model for 
analysing specific communicative interactions and transitions in zoological gardens, 
and not as general categories of stakeholder perceptions. However, the proposed model 
can also be applied in analysing zoological gardens’ self-representation, in order to 
guide their future endeavours. In mapping the causes for a specific communicative 
situation or conflict, a variety of factors need to be studied, including interests and 
cognitive dispositions of the stakeholders, cultural connotations and umwelt structure 
of the involved animal species, institutional goals of the specific zoological garden, etc. 
24 Also a phobic-neutral shift  in perception can use the same tactic.
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Conclusions
In the discourses of animal welfare studies, conservation biology and species manage-
ment, species neutrality is often assumed or propagated as a general principle. We 
have demonstrated from a semiotic viewpoint that although a desirable principle, 
species neutrality almost never exists in actuality. People’s attitudes towards animal 
species depend on, in addition to psychological dispositions of the people themselves, 
biosemiotic conditions (umwelt stucture, biocommunication) and cultural connota-
tions/symbolic meanings. In real-life environments such as zoological gardens, both 
biosemiotic and cultural aspects influence which animals are displayed, as well as 
the various ways in which they are displayed. These dispositions are further used 
as motifs in staging, personifying or de-personifying animals in order to modify 
visitors’ perceptions and attitudes in the direction favoured by the zoo, if those 
perceptions are not extremely contradictory. The communicative encounters and 
shifting perceptions can be analysed on the scales of welfaristic, conservational, 
dominionistic, and utilitarian approaches, which have different exposure to cultural- 
and biosemiotic characteristics of animal species. The methodological approach 
described in this article integrates the static and dynamical approach by proposing to 
analyse semiotic potential of animals and dynamics of communicative interactions in 
combination.25
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Семиотические измерения отношения людей 
к другим животным (на примере зоопарка)
В статье рассматриваются культурные и биосемиотические основы отношения людей 
к другим видам. Относясь критически к видовой нейтральности (species neutrality), 
автор показывает, что отношение человека к разным видам животных зависит от 
психологических предпосылок, биосемиотических условий (например, структуры 
умвельта), культурных коннотаций и символических значений. В условиях реальной 
жизни, например, в зоопарке, биосемиотические и культурные аспекты влияют на 
выбор экспонируемых животных и на то, как их репрезентируют и интерпретируют. 
Эти семиотические предпосылки используются как мотивы в постановке, персони-
фицируя или деперсонифицируя животных, с целью изменить восприятие и отно шение 
посетителей зоопарка. В качестве примера анализируются противоречивые интер -
претации умерщвления жирафа в зоопарке Копенгагена. Коммуникативные сопри-
косновения и меняющиеся перцепции отражаются на шкалах благосостояния, охраны 
природы, доминирования и утилитарности. Применямый методологический подход 
соединяет статические и динамические точки зрения, предлагая совместный анализ 
семиотического потенциала животных и динамики коммуникативных инте ракций. 
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Semiootilised mõõtmed inimeste suhtumises teistese 
loomadesse: loomaaedade näide
Artiklis analüüsitakse inimeste teistesse liikidesse suhtumise kultuurilisi ja biosemiootilisi 
aluseid. Võetakse kriitiline hoiak liigineutraalsuse suhtes ja näidatakse, et inimese suhtumine 
erinevatesse loomaliikidesse sõltub psühholoogilistest eeldustest, biosemiootilistest tingi-
mustest (nt omailma struktuuridest), kultuurilistest konnotatsioonidest ja sümboolsetest 
tähendustest. Tegelikes keskkondades, nt loomaaedades mõjutavad nii biosemiootilised 
kui kultuurilised aspektid seda, milliseid loomi väljapanekusse valitakse ning kuidas neid 
esitatakse ning interpreteeritakse. Neid semiootilisi eeldusi kasutatakse kui motiive, et loomi 
lavas tada, isikustada ning depersonifitseerida ning külastajate taju ning suhtumist muuta. 
Juhtumianalüüsina vaadeldakse Kopenhaageni looma aia kaelkirjaku prakeerimisele antud 
vastandlikke tõlgendusi. Kommunikatiivsed kokkupuuted ning nihkuvad tajud paigutatakse 
heaolu, looduskaitse, domineerimise ning utilitaarse lähenemise skaalale. Artiklis kirjeldatav 
metodoloogiline lähenemine ühendab staatilised ja dünaamilised vaatenurgad, pakkudes 
välja loomade semiootilise potentsiaali ning kommunikatiivsete interaktsioonide dünaamika 
ühisanalüüsi.
